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Право и политика
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Дегтерев Д.А. Международно-правовые и международно-политические исследования: проблемы синтеза

Аннотация: В последние годы как в отечественной, так и в зарубежной международно-правовой науке наблюдается распространение подходов, используемых в политических исследованиях международных отношений. В данной работе дан генезис формирования такой взаимосвязи с конца 1980 гг. Указаны основные причины междисциплинарного синтеза, в т.ч. повышение роли "мягкого" права и распространение механизмов разрешения споров, базирующихся на внутреннем праве основных международных экономических организаций (ВТО, МВФ, Группа Всемирного банка) и интеграционных группировок (ЕС, НАФТА, ЕврАзЭС и др). В статье дан обзор основные направления заимствования, в числе которых диагностика существующих международных проблем, их структурирование и поиск международно-правовых механизмов их решения; анализ структуры и функций, организационного дизайна существующих международных режимов и институтов; вопросы изменения отдельных принципов международного права и самой природы международного права в целом. По каждому из направлений приведены основные исследования. Сделан вывод о том, что распространение инструментария политической науки в международном праве способствует обогащению последнего, формированию плодотворного междисциплинарного синтеза, позволяющего проводить многогранный анализ международной действительности.

Ключевые слова:

Юриспруденция, международное право, международные отношения, междисциплинарные подход, методы правовых исследований, синтез международного права и международных отноше, мягкое право, международные организации, международные режимы, глобальное управление

Abstract: In late years both in Russian and foreign international law science faces the spread of approaches, which are used in political studies of international relations. This work analyzes the genesis of this interrelation starting from late 1980s. The author discusses the main causes of interdisciplinary synthesis, including growing role of the “soft law” and spread of conflict resolution mechanisms base upon the internal law of the main international economic organizations (WTO, IMF, World Bank Group) and integration groups (the EU, the NAFTA, the EurAsEC, etc.). The article contains an overview of the main directions of borrowing, including diagnosing the main international problems, their structuring and searching for the international legal mechanisms for their solution, analysis of structure and functions of organization design of the existing international regimes and institutions, as well as international law as a whole. On each of these directions the author provides the key studies. The conclusion is made that spread of instruments of political science in the international law facilitates its enrichment, formation of the fruitful interdisciplinary synthesis, allowing for the multifaceted analysis of international reality.

Keywords:

Jurisprudence, international law, international relations, interdisciplinary approach, methods of legal studies, synthesis of international law and international relations, soft law, international organizations, international regimes, global administration.


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Библиография
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11. Abbott F. The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic Development. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1996. 72: 385-405.
12. Abbott K. «Trust But Verify»: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements // Cornell International Law Journal, 1993. – 26: 1-58.
13. Abbott K. International Relations Theory, International Law and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts // American Journal of International Law, 1999. – Vol. 93 (2): 361-379.
14. Abbott K. Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers // Yale Journal of International Law. 1989. – 14: 335-411.
15. Abbott K. The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade // Harvard International Law Journal, 1985. – 26: 501-532.
16. Abbott K. Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy // Journal of International Law and International Relations, 2006. – 1: 9.
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20. Benvenisti E. Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law // American Journal of International Law, 1996. – 90: 384-415
21. Biersteker T., Spiro P., Sriram Ch., Raffo V., eds. International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice. – London: Routledge, 2007.
22. Brewster R. Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law. Virginia Law Review, 2006. 92: 251-288.
23. Brunnée J., Toope S. Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building // American Journal of International Law. 1997. – 91: 26-59.
24. Bueno de Mesquito B., Smith A. The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership // Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010. – Vol. 54 (5): 667-686.
25. Byers M. Taking the Law out of International Law: A Critique of the Iterative Perspective // Harvard International Law Journal. 1997. – 38: 201-205.
26. Chayes A., Chayes A. On Compliance // International Organization, 1993. – 47: 175-205.
27. Chayes A., Chayes A. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. – Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
28. Colburn J. Note, Turbot Wars: Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a New U.N. Agreement // Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 1997. – 6: 323-366.
29. Colombatto E., Macey J. A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State // Cardozo Law Review, 1996. – 18: 925-956.
30. Downs G., Rocke D., Barsoom P. The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience? // Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2000. – 38: 465-514.
31. Fidler D. Mission Impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases // Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 1996. – 10: 493-502.
32. Ginsburg T., McAdams R. Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution. William and Mary Law Review, 2004. 45: 1229-1339.
33. Goldsmith J., Posner E. A Theory of Customary International Law. University of Chicago Law Review, 1999. 66: 1113-1177.
34. Goldsmith J., Posner E. The Limits of International Law. Охford University Press, 2005.
35. Goldsmith J., Posner E. Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 2000. 40: 639-672.
36. Goldstein J., Kahler M., Keohane R., Slaughter A. – M., eds. Legalization and World Politics. – Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
37. Hafner-Burton E., Victor D., Lupu Y. Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field // American Journal of International Law, 2012. – Vol. 106, No. 1: 47-97.
38. Hathaway O. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, 2002. 111: 1935-2042.
39. Hathaway O., Koh H., eds. Foundations of International Law and Politics. – New York: Foundation Press, 2005.
40. Hirsch M. The Future Negotiations over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors and Game Theory // Catholic University Law Review, 1996. – 45: 699-722;
41. Keohane R. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. – Princeton University Press, 1984.
42. Keohane R. International Relations and International Law: Two Optics // Harvard International Law Journal, 1997. – 38: 487-502.
43. Koremenos B. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Political Science Review, 2005. 99: 549-565.
44. Koremenos B. If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining? // Journal of Legal Studies, 2007. – 36: 189-212.
45. Koremenos B. Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility. International Organization, 2001. 55: 289-325.
46. Koremenos B. When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?.// Law and Contemporary Problems, 2008. – Vol. 71 (1): 151-192.
47. Koremenos B., Lipson Ch., Snidal D. The Rational Design of International Institutions // International Organization, 2001. – 55 (4): 761-799.
48. Legalization and World Politics (Special Issue) // International Organization. – 2000. – Vol. 54, No 3.
49. Macey J. Chicken Wars as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: What’s in a Game? // Notre Dame Law Review, 1989. – 64: 447-450 (review of Conybeare J., Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry)
50. Mitchell R. Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance // International Organization, 1994. – Vol. 48 (3): 425-458.
51. Mock W. Game Theory, Signaling and International Legal Regulations // George Washington Journal of International Law & Economics, 1992. – 26: 33-66.
52. Montana-Mora M. International Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/ International Relations Perspective on the US/ EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute // North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 1993. – 19: 1.
53. Plotkin B. Mission Possible: The Future of the International Health Regulations // Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 1997. – 6: 503.
54. Raustiala K. Form and Substance in International Agreements. American Journal of International Law, 2005. 99: 581-614.
55. Rochester M. Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International Law – Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006.
56. Schmidt R. International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission // Environmental Law, 1996. – 26: 95-139.
57. Scott R., Stephan P. The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law. 2006. New York: Cambridge University Press.
58. Setear J. An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law // Harvard International Law Journal. 1996. – 37: 139-229.
59. Setear J. Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility. Virginia Law Review, 1997. 83: 1-126.
60. Simmons B., Steinberg R., eds. International Law and International Relations. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
61. Slaughter A. – M. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda // American Journal of International Law. 1993. – 87: 205-239.
62. Slaughter A. – M. Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law // American Journal of International Law, 1995. – 10: 717-731.
63. Slaughter A. – M., Tulumello A., Wood S. International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship // American Journal of International Law. 1998. – 92: 367-397.
64. Swaine E. Unsigning. Stanford Law Review, 2003. 55: 2061-2089.
65. Sykes A. Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations. University of Chicago Law Review, 1991. 58: 255-303.
66. Tsebelis G., Garrett G. Agenda Setting, Vetoes, and the EU’s Codecision Procedure // Journal of Legislative Studies, 1997. – 3: 74-92.
67. Tsebelis G., Garrett G. The Institutional Determinants of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU // International Organization, 2001. – 55(2): 357-390.
68. Tsebelis G., Yataganas X. The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Proposal, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A Veto Players Analysis // European Constitutional Law Review, 2005. – 1 (3): 429-451.
69. Waller S. Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust // University of Kansas Law Review, 1994. – 42: 557-604
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9. Abbott F. Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the Twenty-First Century. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1996. 29: 471-479.
10. Abbott F. Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers. Yale Journal of International Law, 1989. 14: 335-411.
11. Abbott F. The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic Development. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 1996. 72: 385-405.
12. Abbott K. «Trust But Verify»: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements // Cornell International Law Journal, 1993. – 26: 1-58.
13. Abbott K. International Relations Theory, International Law and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts // American Journal of International Law, 1999. – Vol. 93 (2): 361-379.
14. Abbott K. Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers // Yale Journal of International Law. 1989. – 14: 335-411.
15. Abbott K. The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade // Harvard International Law Journal, 1985. – 26: 501-532.
16. Abbott K. Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy // Journal of International Law and International Relations, 2006. – 1: 9.
17. Aceves W. Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship // American University Journal of International Law, 1997. – 12 (2): 227-266.
18. Armstrong D., Farrell Th., Lambert H. International Law and International Relations. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
19. Ayaz Sh. A Theoretic Approach to Transnational Terrorism // Georgetown Law Journal, 1992. – Vol. 80: 2131-2174.
20. Benvenisti E. Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law // American Journal of International Law, 1996. – 90: 384-415
21. Biersteker T., Spiro P., Sriram Ch., Raffo V., eds. International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice. – London: Routledge, 2007.
22. Brewster R. Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law. Virginia Law Review, 2006. 92: 251-288.
23. Brunnée J., Toope S. Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building // American Journal of International Law. 1997. – 91: 26-59.
24. Bueno de Mesquito B., Smith A. The Pernicious Consequences of UN Security Council Membership // Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010. – Vol. 54 (5): 667-686.
25. Byers M. Taking the Law out of International Law: A Critique of the Iterative Perspective // Harvard International Law Journal. 1997. – 38: 201-205.
26. Chayes A., Chayes A. On Compliance // International Organization, 1993. – 47: 175-205.
27. Chayes A., Chayes A. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. – Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
28. Colburn J. Note, Turbot Wars: Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a New U.N. Agreement // Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 1997. – 6: 323-366.
29. Colombatto E., Macey J. A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State // Cardozo Law Review, 1996. – 18: 925-956.
30. Downs G., Rocke D., Barsoom P. The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience? // Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2000. – 38: 465-514.
31. Fidler D. Mission Impossible? International Law and Infectious Diseases // Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 1996. – 10: 493-502.
32. Ginsburg T., McAdams R. Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution. William and Mary Law Review, 2004. 45: 1229-1339.
33. Goldsmith J., Posner E. A Theory of Customary International Law. University of Chicago Law Review, 1999. 66: 1113-1177.
34. Goldsmith J., Posner E. The Limits of International Law. Okhford University Press, 2005.
35. Goldsmith J., Posner E. Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 2000. 40: 639-672.
36. Goldstein J., Kahler M., Keohane R., Slaughter A. – M., eds. Legalization and World Politics. – Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
37. Hafner-Burton E., Victor D., Lupu Y. Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field // American Journal of International Law, 2012. – Vol. 106, No. 1: 47-97.
38. Hathaway O. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law Journal, 2002. 111: 1935-2042.
39. Hathaway O., Koh H., eds. Foundations of International Law and Politics. – New York: Foundation Press, 2005.
40. Hirsch M. The Future Negotiations over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors and Game Theory // Catholic University Law Review, 1996. – 45: 699-722;
41. Keohane R. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. – Princeton University Press, 1984.
42. Keohane R. International Relations and International Law: Two Optics // Harvard International Law Journal, 1997. – 38: 487-502.
43. Koremenos B. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Political Science Review, 2005. 99: 549-565.
44. Koremenos B. If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining? // Journal of Legal Studies, 2007. – 36: 189-212.
45. Koremenos B. Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility. International Organization, 2001. 55: 289-325.
46. Koremenos B. When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?.// Law and Contemporary Problems, 2008. – Vol. 71 (1): 151-192.
47. Koremenos B., Lipson Ch., Snidal D. The Rational Design of International Institutions // International Organization, 2001. – 55 (4): 761-799.
48. Legalization and World Politics (Special Issue) // International Organization. – 2000. – Vol. 54, No 3.
49. Macey J. Chicken Wars as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: What’s in a Game? // Notre Dame Law Review, 1989. – 64: 447-450 (review of Conybeare J., Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry)
50. Mitchell R. Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance // International Organization, 1994. – Vol. 48 (3): 425-458.
51. Mock W. Game Theory, Signaling and International Legal Regulations // George Washington Journal of International Law & Economics, 1992. – 26: 33-66.
52. Montana-Mora M. International Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/ International Relations Perspective on the US/ EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute // North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 1993. – 19: 1.
53. Plotkin B. Mission Possible: The Future of the International Health Regulations // Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 1997. – 6: 503.
54. Raustiala K. Form and Substance in International Agreements. American Journal of International Law, 2005. 99: 581-614.
55. Rochester M. Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International Law – Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006.
56. Schmidt R. International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission // Environmental Law, 1996. – 26: 95-139.
57. Scott R., Stephan P. The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law. 2006. New York: Cambridge University Press.
58. Setear J. An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law // Harvard International Law Journal. 1996. – 37: 139-229.
59. Setear J. Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility. Virginia Law Review, 1997. 83: 1-126.
60. Simmons B., Steinberg R., eds. International Law and International Relations. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
61. Slaughter A. – M. International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda // American Journal of International Law. 1993. – 87: 205-239.
62. Slaughter A. – M. Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law // American Journal of International Law, 1995. – 10: 717-731.
63. Slaughter A. – M., Tulumello A., Wood S. International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship // American Journal of International Law. 1998. – 92: 367-397.
64. Swaine E. Unsigning. Stanford Law Review, 2003. 55: 2061-2089.
65. Sykes A. Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations. University of Chicago Law Review, 1991. 58: 255-303.
66. Tsebelis G., Garrett G. Agenda Setting, Vetoes, and the EU’s Codecision Procedure // Journal of Legislative Studies, 1997. – 3: 74-92.
67. Tsebelis G., Garrett G. The Institutional Determinants of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU // International Organization, 2001. – 55(2): 357-390.
68. Tsebelis G., Yataganas X. The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Proposal, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A Veto Players Analysis // European Constitutional Law Review, 2005. – 1 (3): 429-451.
69. Waller S. Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust // University of Kansas Law Review, 1994. – 42: 557-604
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