The concept of polis religion: content, historical-religious argumentation, criticism / Концепция полисной религии: содержание, историко-религиозная аргументация, критика

Павлов Никита Михайлович ORCID: 0000-0003-4799-7832 студент; кафедра Философии и религиоведения; Православный Свято-Тихоновский гуманитарный университет 156049, Россия, г. Москва, пер. Лихов, 6, оф. 420 Pavlov Nikita Mikhailovich Student; Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies; St. Tikhon's Orthodox University for the Humanities 156049, Russia, Moscow, lane. Likhov, 6, office 420 nika.ss2203@mail.ru

Introduction

Until the middle of the last century, the naive idea of studying Greek religion as collecting data in a "repository of facts" and compiling a unified theology or mythology (die Götterlehre) on their basis still prevailed in ancient historiography.

When researchers became convinced of the futility of this approach, structuralism offered them an analysis of Greek beliefs as a system. At the same time there came the realization that the Greek oikoumene was diverse and differentiated at the level of individual polities. At the end of the 20th century these ideas gave rise to the principle of "embeddedness", which meant that Greek religion was so closely embedded in ancient society that it did not stand out as a separate sphere of social life ^[5].

This principle was realized by the concept of polis religion, which became popular in the history of ancient religion at the very end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. The idea was articulated by Christiana Sourvinou-Inwood (1945-2007) in two articles: "Further Aspects of Polis Religion" ^[16] and "What is Polis Religion?" ^[17]. According to the author of the term, polis religion is a characteristic of ancient religiosity, indicating its inclusion in social and political life. Religion in ancient Greece and Rome exists at three levels - in the individual polis, within the demesa and in the pan-Greek context ^[17]. At each of them it has features that distinguish one community among a number of others. Thanks to them, a citizen defines himself through belonging to a particular place ^[14].

Despite the concept's widespread use in ancient studies, it has received almost no critical reflection, with a few exceptions ^{[10] [14]}, which clearly demonstrate that the idea of polis religion as it exists today still needs clarification. Therefore, in this article I will examine its historical-religious foundations and critique, which will help to point the direction of the necessary future discussions.

Thus, the purpose of this essay is to compare the arguments "for" and "against" the concept of polis religion.

Arguments in favor of the polis religion

In order to reproduce the arguments in favor of the theory of polis religion, in this section I turn primarily to the original works of C. Suorvinou-Inwood, as well as another work by her follower, and attempt to reflect their logic.

In "What is Polis Religion?" and "Further Aspects of Polis Religion," she points to evidence in favor of a close relationship between the political and religious structures of the Greek world, which I summarize below.

First, worship was limited by the principle of citizenship: only within his own city could a Greek freely participate in rites and festivals, while in other polis he became a ξένος "stranger" in need of a πρόξενος "intercessor" ^[17]. If a citizen was deprived of his rights, his participation in the religious life of the city jeopardized the efficacy of the rites and was punishable by death ^[17].

Secondly, even in general Greek cults, the polis principle played a key role: the locals acted as πρόξενοι in relation to the pilgrims. The hierarchy of the visitors to the Delphic oracle also testifies to this: first came his fellow citizens, then the members of the Delphic amphictyony, after them other Greeks, and finally the barbarians. The latter did not participate in the all-polis games, where the competitors defended the honor of their cities ^[17].

Thirdly, there were special religious contacts between the polis: cities sent to each other θεωροί "sacred ambassadors" who performed rites for the sake of their cities in all-Greek sanctuaries. There the offerings on behalf of the whole polis were also left there. Within the inter-polis unions there were close mutual religious relations ^[17].

Fourth, although the gods were common to all Greeks, the degree to which they were honored varied according to the role of them and their heroes in the past and present of a particular polis. The modes of veneration also varied and were apparently perceived as human decrees, quite subject to change under the influence of prophecies. Since there were no sacred scriptures, priesthood with secret knowledge, church, etc., it was the polis in the view of Greek religion that structured the natural chaos, and attempts to distort the ritual were perceived as a threat to the city ^[17].

Fifth, there were cults aimed at maintaining the well-being of the polis as a whole, heroes-eponyms were honored. Any groups (whether territorial, clan, professional or political) within the polis had their own cults in which only their members participated, emphasizing their identity. Therefore, social reforms often caused the emergence and change of the veneration of gods and heroes. Cults of local deities at the level of individual demes and phratries are a special case. However, of course, both participated in the common festivals of their polis ^[17]. The cults of phratries, individual οἶκοι "households" and private mystery cults also depended on the polis and existed within it ^[16].

Sixth, Greek priests conducted rites under the supervision of the polis and could not perform anything outside of their duties. Priests could be all citizens (with some reservations), elected by the community or by lot. They served as symbolic intermediaries between the gods and their community ^[16].

Seventh, the rites were performed at the expense of the polis or demesa, sometimes a separate tax was assigned for this purpose.

Finally, there was a direct link between individual and polis religiosity: elements of personal piety find parallels in polis prayers and rites. C. Suorvinou-Inwood argues that the citizen was the smallest unit of polis cult on the grounds that his personality belonged simultaneously to several communities, distinguished on different grounds: sex, age, profession, etc., and that the citizen was the smallest unit of the polis. In this approach, the polis serves as the Greek "basic religious frame of reference" ^[16].

Having described the main theses of the polis religion as formulated by its author, I give the additional arguments of its proponent below.

The German Hellenist Walter Burkert has written a response, "Greek Poleis and Civic Cults: Some Further Thoughts," to S. Cole's article "Civic Cult and Civic Identity," which I discuss below. In his response, Burkert offers a number of arguments in favor of polis religion, which I will list here, as well as several arguments against, which I will present in the next chapter.

First, he points to the antiquity of the concept itself: blessed Augustine, in On the City of God, quotes the Roman writer Barron as saying that theologia "theology" is divided into civilis "civil," mythica "fable," and physica "physical." Barron refers to Mucius Scevola, and the latter, according to Burkert, depends on Greek philosophy, to which the idea of νομοθετῶν θεολογία "theology of the lawgivers" is known ^[11].

Second, W. Burkert himself distinguishes three levels, or dimensions, of the modern concept of polis religion: first, the Greek city expresses itself through religion. Secondly, it controls religion, and thirdly, moreover, it creates religion itself. The last statement, according to Hellenist, is common to both Varron and C. Suorvinou-Inwood ^[11].

Burkert notes that the development of the polis and temple building roughly coincides chronologically and dates from the VIII-VI centuries B.C. The temple becomes the most important structure of the polis, which is supposedly owned by a deity, but in fact - the city itself. The tradition of building sanctuaries by the king is a thing of the past along with the power of tyrants. However the historian calls to look at this coincidence with caution and gives facts which do not testify about interrelation or clear correlation ^[11].

The facts cited by Burkert counterbalance the criticism of the concept of polis religion and allow us to conclude that polis religion, albeit in a limited form, did take place in ancient religiosity. However, it requires serious modification, since explicit connection and similarity do not yet allow us to speak of the influence of polis and religion on each other.

Having considered this argumentation, it is possible to draw intermediate conclusions. The arguments given by the author of the idea seem to me fair for posing the problem of the interrelation of the polis and religion, and the facts given by W. Burkert bring some clarifications to the concept. The evidence given for the close relationship between political and religious structures in ancient Greek society is convincing, the restricted access of citizens to cults, the role of the polis in general Greek cults, the financial support of religious rituals by the polis - all of this shows a close relationship between the two. Burkert cautions, however, that the link between the polis and religion requires further study and modification.

Argumentation against polis religion

In this section, I provide a critique of the concept under discussion, which was offered by historians soon after the articles by K. Suorvinou-Inwood. Despite the active application of the theory, relatively few researchers have attempted to theorize polis religion ^[14]. This explains the small number of works that I will now review.

In "Civic Cult and Civic Identity," Susan Cole articulates a number of challenges to the idea at hand.

Firstly, the very definition of the polis is not completely clear and is one-sidedly considered by different researchers, emphasizing one or another aspect: architectural, economic and so on. ^[12].

Second, ancient historiography uncritically takes Athens as a model polis, which is deeply flawed. Other polis not only bear little resemblance to Attica, but also to each other, but evidence of their religiosity is scarce ^[12].

Thirdly, one of the ideas of polis religion, the special veneration of a certain god in a certain city, does not find support on the material of small polis. In them several deities were honored at once, to which their inhabitants prayed.

Finally, in a number of cases the political activity of the polis was more important than religious activity. С. Cole gives a number of examples when conspiratorial oaths were annulled, and a citizen who killed a rebel was not considered unclean ^[12].

Thus, S. Cole's criticism can be divided into two aspects: on the one hand, the theory of polis religion ignores the facts concerning small polis. On the other hand, the theoretical framework requires finalization and reflection of its key concepts.

In the article "Greek Poleis and Civic Cults: Some Further Thoughts", which serves as a response to S. Cole's report, the historian offers arguments not only in favor of polis religion, but also against it. According to Burkert, religion is found outside the polis, and polis religion is only a part of Greek religiosity as a whole: there is religion without the polis, even in there is no polis without religion ^[11]. Below I give his objections.

First, it is possible to judge about Greek religion before the emergence of the polis from the Mycenaean civilization: the names of some gods and religious terms are fixed, several cults with a continuous tradition have been found. In addition, some calendars precede the polis period, judging by indirect evidence ^[11].

Second, against C. Suorvinou-Inwood's claim that the polis served as intermediaries between the common Greek sanctuaries and the citizens, Burkert cites the testimony of Xenophontes and postulates the preservation of family cults independent of the state.

Third, the rise of polis religion occurred gradually along with the diminishing role of family cults and charismatic religious leaders. W. Burkert finds traces of this process in the classical period of Greece. Burkert finds traces of this process in the classical period of Greece. However, the scientist does not find any conflicts between the polis and religion.

Fourth, he supports S. Cole in criticizing the thesis of another researcher, Ursula Brackertz, about the patron gods of the polis: the deities together, not separately, patronized the polis, and were not its owners. The local epithets of the gods did not mean that they had anything to do with individual cities.

Finally, Burkert notes that dedicating territories to the gods made practical sense as a way to secure oneself in the Hellenistic period, when monarchies competed for polities ^[11].

The historian's criticism is closely connected with his arguments in favor of the polis religion, which I give in the previous chapter. With the help of archaeological and linguistic evidence, as well as a critical understanding of historical events, W. Burkert argues that polis religion forms only a part of Greek religion as a whole, and that the thesis of the influence of the state on religiosity must be examined critically.

Australian researcher Julia Kindt in her article "Polis Religion: A Critical Appreciation" ^[15] summarizes the concept of polis religion and consistently criticizes it, offering some new arguments against it ^[15] summarizes the concept of polis religion and consistently criticizes it, offering some new arguments against it. I cite them below.

First, J. Kindt questions the main thesis of modern historiography, according to which Greek religion, for example, is distinguished from Christianity by its embeddedness in the polis structure. Referring to Burkert, who divided the concept into three dimensions, she notes that most scholars in fact adhere only to the first, mildest formulation. Thus, they abandon the idea that the polis controls and even creates religion and consider that it only manifests itself in cults. However, even the more general formulation of the idea of polis religion is not completely correct, and the "boundaries" of polis and Greek religion do not coincide.

Kindt cites the Greek oracles, whose questions to them were private rather than civic, and the Greek calendars, which are embedded in the agricultural cycle rather than the polis.

These examples allow the historian to highlight another, softer dimension of polis religion: it represents the symbolic order of the state. This means that the society of the polis shares the same beliefs and ideals within which their personal demands exist ^[15].

According to J. Kindt, K. Suorvinou-Inwood explores religion in the context of Greek culture as a whole, probably in the vein of cultural anthropology. This differs from her declarative claims that the polis controls religion, or it exists within a state framework. The researcher points out: Greek culture is not limited to the polis, so we can speak of polis religion only in the sense that the polis constitutes its "paradigmatic worshipping group". It is embedded in religion and is not the only framework for its understanding ^[15].

Second, the theory of polis religion relies on the notion of consistency and coherence of Greek beliefs and practices. Researchers often overlook inconsistencies and tensions in historical facts. The author refers to Paul Wien, who finds different epistemological discourses with different "truths" in Greek culture. In addition, the Greeks' conceptions of the world changed over time. Therefore, the idea of the polis as an unchanging phenomenon is simplistic and should be replaced by the idea of a flexible structure open to change. It is possible to speak of several cultures within the Greek culture.

J. Kindt points out that K. Suorvinou-Inwood excludes "sectarian" beliefs and rituals from consideration and adheres to a paradigm in which extra-political religiosity is not considered to be religiosity as such, but refers to magic. But this approach risks becoming self-enclosed: it marginalizes exactly those areas of religious activity which the model cannot sufficiently explain.

It is impossible to separate phenomena such as Orphism, magic, and mystery from traditional religion because they are embedded in its narratives. Participation in such cults and in polis rites was not mutually exclusive; the same Greeks practiced both polis religion and magic. For this reason, Kindt proposes the concept of "thin coherence," according to which diversity is intrinsic to Greek religion, and individual beliefs and rituals are connected within Greek culture in a less deterministic way. However, this is an area that has yet to be explored.

Third, despite the fact that modern historiography contrasts local and pan-Greek levels of religion, both have hardly ever been theorized. In academic works, there is no comprehension of which myths belong to local traditions and which are recognized by all Greeks.

It is the concept of polis religion that can solve this problem if it takes into account the diversity of local urban traditions. By some estimates, Greece consisted of more than a thousand polis. It is necessary to contextualize each local cult within its own polis.

Fourth, during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Greek religion underwent tremendous changes, losing its polis status. For this reason, historians often focus on the Archaic and Classical periods, which are combined despite the differences between them. Hellenistic religion is analyzed through the prism of the polis only sporadically. Kindt illustrates the difficulties in combining synchronic and diachronic analysis with the example of Robert Parker's two-volume work on Athenian religion. The development of an adequate combination of analyses would greatly help antiquarianism.

Fifth, the concept of polis religion pays insufficient attention to personal beliefs versus rituals embedded in a civic context. Historians often ignore the representations behind the rituals, which in turn impoverishes the analysis and provides an incomplete picture of ancient Greek religion.

Finally, the emphasis on the polis dimension of religion has until recently crowded out from the attention of historians the other frameworks in which Greek religion manifests itself. This state of affairs has changed only recently, with scholars paying more attention to extra-polysial religion. According to J. Kindt, this signals the victory of poststructuralism over the structuralist approach to the history of religion. The polis is now seen not as the outcome of the development of more primitive structures such as τὰ ἔθννη "ethnoses," but as their alternative, just one stage in a series of others. Religion, therefore, may also take other forms, especially on the outskirts of the oikoumene, both in earlier and later periods. The role of ethnoses in the development of ancient Greek religion should not be underestimated ^[15].

These arguments do not force the researcher to abandon the concept of polis religion, because it has its own strengths: it points to the basic organizing principle of the Greek world and forces the historian to deal with religion at the local level before extrapolating his observations. However, the idea also has some serious drawbacks: the inclusion of religion in the polis is not sufficiently theorized. The structural and chronological unity of Greek religion is uncritically overemphasized. Finally, the concept does not answer all of the historian's questions, in particular, how the Greeks themselves understood religion and what they believed.

The article by J. Kindt not only comprehensively criticizes the concept, but also evaluates its strengths and offers options for the development of the idea. The work marks a transition to a new paradigm, the route of which is only emerging in modern antiquity.

The British researcher in Esther Eidinow's article "Networks and Narratives: A Model for Ancient Greek Religion" also criticizes the concept of polis religion for the limited possibilities of its application and proposes to replace it with the "Social Network Theory", which better explains cases that seem marginal and anomalous. I outline E. Eidinow's arguments below.

First, the historian criticizes Suorvinou-Inwood for the fact that her approach relies heavily on Athens of the Classical era, more reminiscent of the static "net" of Greek religiosity than the dynamic "network" (a play on words that can only be conveyed with difficulty). This methodology does not work when it comes to the rituals of other polities, such as ethnos. Moreover, it is immune to diachronic changes in Greek society ^[13].

Eidinow illustrates the defended theory by two cases: first, the wandering magicians, ὀρφεοτελεσταί, find almost no place in the concept of polis religion, and their activity is classed as personal religiosity. Magic cannot in fact be separated from religion, and the activity of the magician may also be aimed at strengthening social ties rather than at destroying them, as is commonly believed. Spells are used by members of the polis within its framework (for example, for political purposes), but without its authorization. The very existence of malicious magic used in a political context indicates that the polis in reality was not a beautiful stable picture, but a living dynamic organism. Therefore, the social network theory allows us to better understand the place of magic in the polis: the alliance of people with deities arises as a response to changing social conditions, an attempt to gain support in a conflict ^[13].

Secondly, K. Suorvinou-Inwood herself notes that the Orphic cult is outside the polis. But E. Eidinow criticizes this binary opposition "the polis - not the polis" and gives examples that some Greeks considered the Orphics and their practices to be within their social circle. It is not enough to say that a cult is included in the polis religion if its participants are citizens of the polis. Their activities are better explained by social network theory: the Orphics, and other cultists, form their own "sub-networks" within wider networks.

Instead, Eidinow proposes "social network theory," according to which actors interact with each other and form ties. These can be of any size, from an individual to a polis or more. In trying to describe and structure these ties, the researcher relies on the work of sociologist Harrison White. According to him, the "atomic particle" of a social network is not a person, but an identity. When interacting with other identities, a state of uncertainty arises, which can be overcome only by controlling the context, by trying to root oneself in connection with other identities. The resulting social space is called a "network domain" (netdom), in which there are different "orders" between which identities move. The result is a dynamic picture of society, where people are in constant motion and create "stories" to explain their place. Networks are organized into "institutions", which are governed and constrained by "control regimes". Like everything else in the system, they change over time ^[13].

When analyzing historical facts in detail, it turns out that the strict picture of polis religion proposed by K. Suorvinou-Inwood does not stand up to criticism. Suorvinou-Inwood does not stand up to criticism. Therefore, E. Eidinow proposes to reformulate it in the framework of the social network theory: there are autonomous subgroups in a group of citizens. The polis either tries to influence them or ignores them. Interactions can also take place at smaller levels, for example at the level of the demes, or between religious communities themselves. The polis acts as an "institution" that connects different social systems and supplies them with meanings and dogmas. Polis religion, in turn, constitutes a "controlling regime" that offers a unified narrative for its members. The religious history of ancient Greece represents a struggle of "regimes" that can be better understood through social network theory. It clearly shows that the polis was not the only framework, but still needs to be further developed and elaborated ^[13].

I will now summarize this section, in which criticisms of polis religion have been examined. The criticisms can be summarized into basic types:

First is the theoretical underdevelopment of the concept. This includes methodological criticisms such as researchers' implicit assumptions and lack of clear definitions.

Second, it is a contradiction with historical facts. To this category belongs the neglect of data from other polis in comparison with Athens, as well as the ignoring of facts contrary to the state status of religion.

Finally, some scholars offer a philosophical critique of polis religion and overthrow the paradigms within which the very formulation of the concept is possible.

The above criticisms seem to me to be fair. In the following section, I compare the arguments for and against, offering a balanced view of the concept of polis religion and some thoughts on the further development of this idea.

Polis religion - past, present and future

In the previous two sections, I have dealt alternately with the arguments in favor of and against polis religion. Here I summarize, taking into account their mutual criticism, those aspects of their views that seem to me to be correct, formulate the current state of affairs in the development of the theory of polis religion and the prospects for its development.

The concept of polis religion in its weak formulation can be considered uncontested: formulated as early as C. Sourvinou-Inwood, it is recognized by critics as well and therefore can be considered as its nuclear position. Ancient Greek religion is closely related to the polis, both institutions are embedded in the context of Greek culture. They mutually influence each other, but are not reducible one to the other, nor are they fully expressed in each other. Their close connection is expressed in the inscription of many cults in the state context ^[1], and is also confirmed by Greek self-awareness: the concept of state mythology was known in Antiquity, and the Greeks realized themselves as both citizens and religious subjects.

On the other hand, no one, as it seems to me, disputes the following shortcomings of the theory: first, the degree of its applicability decreases in direct proportion to the chronological and cultural distance of a particular polis from classical Athens, to which the theory is most applicable. This means that in archaic polis that had not reached the level of civic self-consciousness, as in Attica, other sociological laws were in force, and religiosity there was less connected with the polis (not to mention ethnic groups, marginal polities in modern historiography) ^[8]. In addition, Greece in both the Mycenaean and Hellenistic periods was far from the polis ideal of the classical era, and religion in this period should be described differently. Second, polis religion describes mainly the ritual side of Greek religiosity, ignoring the attitudinal basis. This means that the psychological background is left out of the researcher's attention.

Researchers, while offering a critique of polis religion, have outlined the prospects for its development. Even W. Burkert drew attention to the fact that the interaction between the state and beliefs should be rethought, and the polis religion should be included in the field of Greek religion as a whole, which is undoubtedly larger than the field of urban control. Actually questions about the relationship between the political and the religious are eternal questions that continue to play a role in the formation of urban political culture even today ^{[3] [4]}.

J. Kindt also reflects in the key of state-religious interaction, speaking about the embeddedness of religion in Greek culture, which may actually be several. Finally, the most extravagant solution to the problem is offered by E. Eidinow, who inscribes polis religion in the theory of social network, where he proposes to operate not with individuals in the framework of polis, but with identities in the network of interactions and dynamic institutions. Undoubtedly, the latter development must receive its own critique in order to stand as a theory in Antiquity Studies.

I can already see a number of observations that might be useful for the development of the idea: first, this level of detailed deconstruction of the individual on identity is in some cases not necessary, and sometimes impossible, if we are working with materials of limited reliability. There still seems to be an implicit positivist attitude to the facts in this concept, which are interpreted as they have come down to us. However, they have yet to be read critically as a text (it seems to me that in this sense the application of P. Wien's concepts would be useful). Second, social network theory as it is currently presented does not offer systematic approaches to the study of religion, without which it will remain a declarative recognition of the impossibility of describing the historical situation in simple synchronous systems. Thus, at this stage, the metamorphosis of polis religion requires deconstruction as a method and constructive provisions of the theory easily applicable in practice.

Researchers have already paid attention to the fact that the development of the concept in question lies in the mainstream of intellectual thought of the XX-XXI centuries. Starting with J. Kindt, the idea of C. Sourvinou-Inwood was conceptualized within the framework of structuralism, cultural anthropology and received the corresponding poststructuralist criticism: a slender synchronic system should be undone from the point of view of diachrony and marginal phenomena. In this direction, it seems to me, there is still a lot of work to be done.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that in domestic historiography the criticism of the concept of polis religion has not yet been developed at all: in the textbook of V. V. Dementieva and I. E. Surikov there is absolutely no speech about religion outside the polis, the authors uncritically reproduce the theses of C. Sourvinou-Inwood that the state fully embraces Greek religiosity ^[9]. Similarly, A. V. Belousov's textbook lacks the necessary criticism of the polis religion, uncritically talks about its introduction into the state ^[6]. In my opinion, the Russian historiography pays too little attention to the concept in question, although enough attention is paid to other dimensions of the phenomenon of the polis and its influence on the social structure of both antiquity and the early Middle Ages ^{[7] [8]}.

Summary

In the present article on the content, historical-religious argumentation and criticism of the polis religion, I have set out to compare the arguments "for" and "against" the concept of the polis religion.

In the first section I identified the arguments in favor of the idea of polis religion. Having analyzed the articles of two specialists, I have highlighted the main theses and the facts supporting them. In the second section, I formulated a critique of the concept under discussion: I compared the works of historians discussing religion in ancient Greece and identified the main arguments against the polis religion. In the third section, I summarized: by comparing the arguments for and against, I offered a consensual view of the polis religion in modern historiography and, by briefly describing the evolution of the idea within philosophical paradigms, suggested research perspectives. Finally, I found that the topic of polis religion is almost undeveloped in domestic anticology.

In my opinion, the scholarly consensus on the theory at the moment can be formulated as follows: the concept of polis religion can be retained only in its weak formulation. Indeed, ancient Greek religion is closely related to the polis; they influence each other but do not express each other fully. Their connection is evident in the embedding of cults in the polis context. However, the theory has its limitations, especially in polis distant from classical Athens and in different periods of Greek history, continuing itself in the perception of "Urbi" in ancient Roman religious and political ^[2] thinking. Finally, the concept mainly focuses on rituals and ignores the psychological aspect. Its limited application forces researchers to seek new approaches to the study of Greek religiosity.

I hope that this article will serve as a modest contribution to the future study of the concept in Russian historiography.