

SENTENTIA

European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

1, 2013

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

DENIS DANILENKO

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Aix-Marseille University,
3 Avenue Robert Schuman, 13090 Aix-en-Provence, France.
E-mail: danilenko_d@nbpublish.com, sententia@nbpublish.com

EDITORIAL COLLEGIUM:

RUBEN APRESYAN

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Head of Ethics Division, head of the Department of Axiology and Philosophical Anthropology at Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Honorary Doctor, Uppsala University (Sweden).
Volkhonka St, 14/1, bld. 5, Moscow, 119991, Russia.
[apressyan@mail.ru]

ZHANG BAICHUN

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Director of the Institute for the History of Natural Sciences (IHNS), Chinese Academy of Science (CAS).
137 Chao-yang-men-nei Street. 100010. Beijing P.R. China.
[zhang-office@ihns.ac.cn; zhangbaichun@sina.com]

YURY M. BATURIN

Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Pilot-cosmonaut of Russia; Director, S.I. Vavilov Institute for the History of Science and Technology Russian Academy of Sciences.
1/5, Staropansky per., Moscow, Russia, 109012.
[baturin@ihst.ru, yubat@mail.ru]

ALEXANDER BELOHLAVEK

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Department of Law, Faculty of Economics, Ostrava Czech Republic; Chief of the Department of; International Law, Faculty of Law and Administration WSM, Warsaw, Poland; Visiting professor on the Department of International and EU Law and in the Department of Civil Law, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic; Attorney-at-Law; President of the World Jurist Association, Washington D.C., USA.
Law offices of Prof. Alexander Belohlavek. Jana Zajice, 32. CZ-17000. Praha 7, Czech Republic.
[a.belohlavek@ablegal.cz]

PETR BLIZKOVSKY

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Director, Council of the European Union; General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; Directorate-General B — Agriculture, Fisheries, Social Affairs and Health; Directorate 2 — Agricultural Structures, Rural Development, Agri-monetary and Agri-financial Issues, Plant Health, Organic Products, Food Quality, GMOs, Codex Alimentarius, Plant Protection.
Rue de la Loi 175, 1048 Brussels, Belgium.
[petr.blizkovsky@consilium.europa.eu]

ENRICO CAMILLERI

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Department of Politics, Law and Society, Faculty of Laws, University of Palermo.
University of Palermo, Via Maqueda, 172, 90133 Palermo, Italy.
[enrico.camilleri@unipa.it]

TOMAS MARIANO CALVO-MARTINEZ

Doctor of Philosophy, Full Professor of Philosophy at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM). Vicepresident of the Institut International de Philosophie (IIP), President of the Sociedad Ibérica de filosofía griega (SIFG).
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Ciudad Universitaria — 28040, Madrid, Espagne.
[tcalvo@filos.ucm.es]

ALEXANDER CHUMAKOV

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, First Vice-President of the Russian Philosophical Society.
Volkhonka St, 14/1, bld. 5, Moscow, 119991, Russia.
[chumakov@iph.ras.ru]

OLGA DUBOVIK

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Leading Scientific Research Fellow of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
119019, Russia, Moscow, ul. Znamenka, 10.
[o.l.dubovik@yandex.ru]

VLADIMIR DURCIK

Doctor of Philosophy, Assistant-Professor of Philosophy, Department of Ethics and Applied Ethics the Faculty of Humanities of Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica (Banská Bystrica, Slovakia).
Tajovského 51, Banská Bystrica. PSČ: 974 01. Slovensko. Kancelária: J03.
[vladko96@mail.ru; Vladimir.Durcik@umb.sk]

NATALIA ERPYLEVA

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of the Private International Law, Faculty of Laws, National Research University "The Higher School of Economics".
Myasnitskaya street, 20. 101000 Moscow, Russia.
[natasha.erpyleva@rambler.ru]

PAVEL S. GUREVICH

Doctor of Philosophy, Doctor of Philology, Professor, Head of the History of Anthropological Exercise Sector of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
119991, Russia, Moscow, ul. Volkhonka. 14/1, str. 5, komn. 432.
[gurevich@rambler.ru]

JONATHAN HARRIS

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor The Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London, University of London, Great Britain.
The Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London, Strand, London. WC2R 2LS. United Kingdom.
[jonathan.harris@kcl.ac.uk]

PETER KNOEPFEL

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Institut de hautes études en administration publique (Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration), L'Université pour le service public.
Quartier UNIL Mouline — CH-1015 — Lausanne, Swiss.
[peter.knoepfel@idheap.unil.ch]

OLIVIER LE BOT

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Aix-Marseille University.
Faculté de droit — GERJC/ILF, 3 Avenue Robert Schuman, 13628 AIX-EN-PROVENCE CEDEX 1, France.
[olivierlebot@gmail.com]

WILLIAM L. MCBRIDE

Arthur G. Hansen Distinguished Professor, Doctor of Philosophy, Director, Philosophy & Literature, Department of Philosophy, Purdue University (In.,USA). President (2008-) of FISP (International Federation Philosophical Societies).
100 N. University St., W. Lafayette, IN 47907-2098, USA.
[wmcbride@purdue.edu]

LARA MODICA

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Confirmed Researcher in Private Law, Department of General Private Law, Faculty of Laws, University of Palermo.
University of Palermo, Via Antonio Veneziano, 120, 90138 Palermo, Italy.
[lara.modica@unipa.it]

JANA PLAŇAVOVÁ LATANOWICZ

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Docent in the EU Law Centre for Europe University of Warsaw.
University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland.
[j.planavova@uw.edu.pl]

ALLA RERICHT

PhD, University of Hamburg.
Universität Hamburg, Mittelweg 177. 20148, Hamburg, Deutschland.
[alla.roehricht@gmx.de]

FRANJO STIBLAR

Doctor of Legal Sciences, Professor, Department of Economic Law, Faculty of Laws, University of Ljubljana.
University of Ljubljana Faculty of Law, Poljanski nasip 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia.
[franjo.stiblar@pf.uni-lj.si]

WALI TEYMOURI

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Deputy for International Affairs Iranian National Center for Globalization Studies (INCGS) the Head of Conference International Committee.
No 17, 18th Western Street, Allameh Shomali Ave, Saadat-Abad, Tehran, Iran. P.C.1997987631.
P.O.Box: 14395-775.
[waliteymouri@yahoo.fr]

Contents

PHILOSOPHY

Gurevich, P. S.

The phenomenon of spirit in philosophical understanding of man 4

Asadullaev, I.K.

The Eight Challenge of the Millennium? Part 1.

Emptiness is matter. The hypothesis of incompleteness
of the principle of conservation of mass and energy 9

Asadullaev, I.K.

Eight Challenge of the Millennium? Part 2.

«Exhalation» of Black Holes as Transition from Light Matter
into Conditions of Non-Participation of Dark Matter

(On the new philosophical categories of participation
and non-participation) 17

HISTORY

Spirova, E.M.

Why do we need history? 23

ANTHROPOLOGY

Omelchuk, R.K.

Evolution of rationality: intellect and the intelligible truth 28

LAW

Admiralova, I.A.

Peculiarities of the initial investigation of human trafficking 42

Kostennikov, M.V., Kurakin, A.V.

Corruption prevention in state administration

and civil service system in the Russian Federation..... 49

Erpyleva, N.Yu., Butler, W.E.

Proceedings with the Participation of Foreign Persons

in International Procedural Law of Russia and Ukraine.....61

SOCIOLOGY

Kanasz, T.

Emotion and Value Perspectives in Sociological Investigation of Happiness.....80

ECONOMICS

Tinyakova, E.A.

Professional Ethics for Business Relations 93

Stiblar, F.F.

Economies of federal units of ex-Yugoslavia after independence 100

R.K. Omelchuk

Evolution of rationality: intellect and the intelligible truth

Abstract. The author examines value transformation of intellect and considers it in close interrelation of intellect with attainable truth. The paper specifies how intellect determines an object of cognition. The author argues that during the various periods of history of philosophy types of intellect have had specific ways of disclosure of the truth, determining priorities of personal self-identification. It is concluded that value transformation of intellect (buddhi, zhi, logos, reason, mens, ratio, intellect) is the basis of formation of modern scientific and technological civilization with its prudent-consumer attitude towards nature, society and a human. The paper will be of interest not only to philosophers, but also to all those who are interested in current problems of human being and cultural development of society.

Key words: rationality, types of intellect, truth, cognition, values' heredity, history of philosophy, ontology of belief, value transformation, human being, cultural tradition.

It's known that cognition implies not only the presence of a subject and an object, but also that the truth is objective, ie. it always refers to the object. Objectivity of the truth means also that it refers to the subject but in a less degree than to the object, and it is a motivating factor of cognition.

However, cognition necessarily implies such description of phenomena, that will be comprehended by other observers. In addition to it, cognition inevitably implies formation of specific world view, the interpretation of which is determined by an individual ability of cognizer to process emerging in his mind images and thoughts into consistent model of

(The paper was prepared with the support of the Russian Foundation for Humanities (project «Interdisciplinary research of socio-cultural mechanisms of values' heredity», Grant № 11-33-00111a2).)

OMELCHUK, Roman Konstantinovich — *PhD in Philosophy, associate professor of the Department of Social and Economic Disciplines at East Siberian Educational Academy, Russia, 664011, Irkutsk, Nizhnyaya Naberezhnaya Street, 6.*
[r.k.omelchuk@gmail.com]

Interrelation between different kinds of intellect and kinds of truth attainable with it

Cultural tradition	Type of intellect	Method of cognition	Object of cognition
Ancient India	<i>buddhi</i>	bhakti yoga (loving devotional service), ashtanga yoga (meditation) and jnana yoga (philosophical contemplation)	Absolute Truth as Bhagavan, Paramatma and Brahman
Ancient China	<i>zhi</i>	<i>li</i> (ritual) as a form of symbolic thinking	Tao, Heaven, The Great Limit
Ancient Greece	<i>logos</i>	hearing of epos, self-knowledge, psychomaietics dialogue	Myth, Cosmos, Idea, One
Medieval Europe	<i>reason</i> , common sense	revelation of intellect, attained by means of belief	God (<i>Theos</i>)
Renaissance	mind (<i>mens</i>)	determining inner limit of thing	infinity
New time	<i>ratio</i>	abstract (theoretical) thinking	objective laws of nature
XX century	<i>intellect</i>	specialized thinking as qualification in having information	relative laws of artificially created systems

reality. Traditionally, cognition in philosophy is carried out by means of intellect, which has always played the role of an instrument of cognition. But historically intellect performed various functions and therefore supposed different notions of truth¹.

Let's note that the uniqueness and originality of intellect as *logos* and intellect as *ratio* were examined by many researchers in various aspects², but generalization and comparison of the known types of intellect in the context of value approach has not been accomplished yet. Let's explore the functional features of different types of intellect, summarized in Chart 1.

It would be proper to consider *buddhi* in the context of two different philosophies of ancient India: Vedic and Buddhist. Vedic philosophy considers intellect to be the main tool of familiarizing oneself with world. For example, in the dictionary of Sanskrit terms and

concepts *buddhi* is defined as an individual spiritual intellect which distinguishes between principle of mind and principle of will; as synthesizing mental capacity to make decisions based on cognition carried out by means of mind (*manas*). The human form of life is realized on the platform of intellect: fulfillment of religious duty (dharma), economic development (artha), achieving the desired (kama) and liberation from various types of material bondage (moksha) always imply schooling and, therefore, active use of intellect.

The object of *buddhi* is Absolute truth in one of its three aspects: personal (Bhagavan), localized (Paramatma) and impersonal (Brahman) ones. The disclosure of these aspects of truth requires great attention and great precision, since personal aspect of truth is not limited to such characteristics as «Lord», «God», «Holy», «Creator», «Father»; a localized aspect of the truth is not limited to such characteristics as «conscience», «inner voice», «witness», «ubiquitous», and impersonal aspect of the truth is not limited to such characteristics as «light», «infinity», «eternity», «spirit». Thus, in ancient India it was noted

¹ Rowlands M. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 249 p.

² Avtonomova N.S. Reason. Intellect. Rationality. M.: Nauka Publishing Co., 1988. P. 10-26.

that the focus of intellect on a particular aspect of the truth determines not only the principles of life and personal qualities of a man, but also his future. All the texts of the Vedas are directly or indirectly devoted to characterization of Absolute Truth, so the interpretation of any part of the Vedas bears subjective tone in accordance with man's individual value approach to the truth. On the basis of the most reputable sources available today on the subject, let's note that Bhagavan in his essence is «All-attractive», or the source of absolute bliss (ananda), Paramatma in his essence is a «teacher in the heart», or the source of absolute knowledge (chit), and Brahman in his essence is «impersonal shining», or the source of eternity (sat). According to the Upanishads, Brahman is the impersonal Absolute, ineffable in any characteristics (such as infinite, constant and so on), but comprehensible in the process of philosophical speculation (jnana-yoga). Paramatma, according to Bhagavad-Gita is the Supersoul, accompanying the individual soul (atma), guiding her in the world and comprehensible in the process of meditation (ashtanga yoga). Bhagavan, according to Srimad-Bhagavatam is the Supreme Person, Krshna, comprehensible in the process of loving devotional service³.

Buddhi-yoga in «Bhagavad Gita» is looked on as a method of attainment of truth under the guidance of self-realized person. Being an experienced teacher, such a person uses apprentice's propensities to cause in him a desire to be free from material bondage and attain the highest perfection — bhakti (loving devotion to Krshna). So, Krshna says to Arjuna: «To those who are constantly devoted to serving Me with love, I give the understanding by which they can come to Me»⁴. *Buddhi* in this case functions as a center of self-control and coordination of the individ-

ual, concentrating all the personal potential to achieve a single goal — to restore the lost inter-personal relationships with God.

Not the personal aspect of the truth, not God as a person, but the Personality of God — that is the conclusion of *buddhi*, clearly identifying the cognizing subject as a unique spiritual personality with individual qualities and value relationships. Intellect, in this case, is synonymous with determination to overcome selfish sensuality (ahankara) for the sake of attaining bhakti, since «a person who has developed a taste for the higher, loses interest in anything else»⁵.

Buddhist philosophy also considers *buddhi* as prerequisite for liberation from material bondage and attainment of nirvana (in fact, the semantic meanings of *buddha* as a liberated state of consciousness, and *buddhi* as the enlightened mind are the same)⁶. However, it should be noted that both liberation and nirvana are «negative» categories in the sense that they imply aspiration, taken only as a negation of material bondage (Sanskrit *moksha* is liberation from the illusions of the mind, i.e. the freedom from all kinds of desires) and negation of causes of suffering (Sanskrit nirvana means «extinction of kleshas», i.e. «extinction of causes of suffering»). Such «negative» characteristic of the object of cognition in the ancient philosophy of India, China and Greece was thoroughly examined by D.L. Rodzinskiy⁷. According to him, the object of cognition in the ancient philosophy is «nonexistence» («nothing»), which is characterized as eternal, good, infinite and single «emptiness», «formlessness», «permanence». As an example of it lets provide free statement of «Chandogya Upanishad» impersonal emphasis in which is easily recognized: «Father asked the son, whom for many years

³ Prabhupada A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami. Sri Isopanisad. Los Angeles: ISKCON books, 1969. P. 77; Prabhupada A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami. Bhagavad-Gita as It is. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972. P. 678-686; Prabhupada A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami. Srimad-Bhagavatam. Canto 1: Creation (chapters 1-9). New York: Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1972. P. 98.

⁴ Prabhupada A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami. Bhagavad-Gita as It is. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972. P. 542.

⁵ Prabhupada A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami. Srimad-Bhagavatam. Canto 5: The Creative Impetus (chapters 1-13). New York: Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1975. P. 114.

⁶ See: Religious Experience // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/> (First published 11 November 2011).

⁷ Rodzinskiy D.L. Nonexistence and Existence of Consciousness in the Early Forms of Indian, Chinese and Greek Philosophy. M.: Publishing house of Moscow Psychological and Social Institute, 2006. 280 p.

learned from best of Brahmins of the country and now went home: «Do you know what is the most important in life, what the cause of all things is, and what the ultimate aim is?». The son was at a loss and couldn't answer the question. Then the father asked him to bring the acorn of nearby oak. «From what does this magnificent old oak tree grow?» — the father asked. «Of course, from this acorn» — the son answered. «Cut it and see what is inside the acorn». Son cut the acorn and found the pulp. «What is in this pulp?» — the father asked the son. The son cut the pulp and saw a large void, which occupied a core. «Do you see this life-giving emptiness from which the pulp originates — the pulp which gives life to the acorn that will eventually grow into a huge oak tree?». «Yes» — the son said. «So you should know that from this emptiness all appears so that one day to go back in it. Now go back to your teachers, because if you have not learned this, then your knowledge is worthless»⁸.

Impersonality as a fundamental principle of Buddhism was pointed out by F. Nietzsche, who noted the following: «sodann eine über-grosse Reizbarkeit der Sensibilität, welche sich als raffinierte Schmerzfähigkeit ausdrückt, sodann eine Übergeistigung, ein allzulanges Leben in Begriffen und logischen Prozeduren, unter dem der Person-Instinkt zum Vortheil des «Unpersönlichen» Schaden genommen hat»⁹ [an extraordinary spirituality, a too protracted concern with concepts and logical procedures, under the influence of which the instinct of personality has yielded to a notion of the «impersonal»].

Adding together characteristics of intellect and its object in the ancient Indian philosophy and associating it with similar characteristic of intellect in the ancient Chinese philosophy, let's cite J. Ortega y Gasset: «Pero al través del defectuoso instrumento conceptual respaldea en la intención asiática, desde luego y siempre -tal vez la cosa es sólo problemática

con respecto a China-, la tendencia a pensar a Dios como lo otro que la naturaleza, como lo transnatural o sobrenatural. Lo natural y, por tanto, lo humano es la realidad constitutivamente manca, insuficiente, tanto que aislada y por sí no podría existir, no tendría realidad. El hombre se siente como fragmento inválido de otra realidad completa y suficiente que es lo divino. Para quien vive desde esa convicción, la existencia consiste en referir constantemente el propio ser deficiente ala ultra-realidad divina, que es la verdadera. Se vive desde Dios, desde la relación del hombre con Dios, no desde sí mismo»¹⁰ [Despite the fallaciousness of the conceptual tools, Asia is always and everywhere (except for, perhaps, China) characterized by tendency to look on God as something which is different form nature, to consider him to be supernatural. Both «natural» and «human» imply defective in its essence «one-sided» reality: as soon as it turns out to be isolated and loses its ability to exist by itself, it stops to be a reality. A man realizes himself as a small imperfect part of different reality — a complete and authentic reality of the divine. For anyone who lives in such a frame of mind, to exist means to bring one's own imperfect being to divine super-reality, which is the true reality. Such a man does not live by himself, but by God and by his relationship to God].

Intellect in terms of Chinese philosophy is defined as *zhi*. A.I. Kobzev notes that *zhi* is a category of Chinese philosophy, which expresses two divergent semantic ranges: 1) reasonableness, mind, intellect, wisdom, and 2) ingenuity, cunning, stratagem»¹¹. According to the researcher, the first semantic range (especially in the ancient works written before the reform of writing in 213 B.C.) is often used not only in the sense of pure forms of cognition, but also in the sense of conscious action and experience. According to H. Roseman, such

⁸ Rodzinskiy D.L. Nonexistence and Existence of Consciousness in the Early Forms of Indian, Chinese and Greek Philosophy. M.: Publishing house of Moscow Psychological and Social Institute, 2006. P. 12-13.

⁹ Nietzsche F. Der Antichrist. Erstausgabe, 1895. P. 21.

¹⁰ Ortega y Gasset J. En Torno a Galileo (esquema de las crisis). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1984. P. 50. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.4shared.com/office/3wYn-CQz/1933_En_torno_a_Galileo_Jos_Or.html (2 September 2013).

¹¹ Kobzev A.I. Zhi; Zhi-sin // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia. Vol. 1: Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov. Moscow: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. P. 572-577.

actions are not so much cognition and understanding but realization and implementation¹². In this case *zhi* is the foundation of a meaningful life in a chaotic world and it is most accurately captured by the word «vedenie»¹³ which means a synthesis of the knowledge and belief, or reference (qualification)¹⁴.

In history of philosophy *zhi* was interpreted in various ways. On the one hand, in the philosophy of Taoism *zhi* is synonymous with «non-action» (*wu wei*), and suggests a refusal of activity that is inconsistent with the world order (*Tao*). On the other hand, idea of direction and scope of coverage of *zhi* can be got from the Taoist treatise «Zhuangzi», which states: «Great knowledge embraces the whole... small knowledge, a part only»¹⁵. As Confucius looked on *zhi* as «justice in dealing with people and respectfully cautious distance from *shens* and spirits», distinguishing between *zhi* and *ren*, Mencius (372-289 B.C.) looked on *zhi* as immanence which along with *ren* is inherent in human being from birth. According to the latter, *zhi* contains such values as humanity and justice. The degree of activating of *zhi* (its current state) can be understood due to the following: «When speeches are one-sided, I know how [the mind of the speaker] is clouded over; when they are extravagant, I know wherein [the mind] is snared; when they are all-depraved, I know how [the mind] has deprecated [from principle]; when they are evasive, I know how [the mind] is at its [wit's] end»¹⁶. Mencius's

students came from the fact that «intellect, based on perceptual knowledge, explains the causes of things, and reaches such clarity and precision as if things are before the eyes»¹⁷. Such an intellect provides an understanding of the essence of things that is not only comprehension (result of meditation, study and systematization), but also the result of connection of gained experience with knowledge of the past. Wang Chong (about 27-104 A.D.) interpreted *zhi* as a commitment to absolute goodness. Thereby he placed emphasis on the concept of «man of ethics» (*homo moralis*), and not on «rational man» (*homo sapiens*).

It also should be noted that *zhi* is closely related to *sin*. So, as A.G. Yurkevich, looking on *sin* as «heart/intellect», «heart/consciousness», closely associates it with cognition of one's own nature and heaven (*tian*), i.e. of the Nature itself, A.I. Kobzev, considering *sin* as an amalgamation of ideas of subjective assurance and objective authenticity, associates it with sense of confidence and inspiring of confidence¹⁸. According to the latter, «unlike Western analogous categories «knowledge/intellect» (*zhi*), on one side, and «belief/loyalty» (*sin*) on the other side, in traditional Chinese philosophy were in the cross-correlation, and didn't make the antinomy. Moreover, semantically they overlapped in typical of Chinese mentality connection of subjective and objective, theoretical and practical aspects of semantics, since the criterion of authenticity, of knowledge and belief was considered to be realized in reasonable and trustworthy deeds»¹⁹. In principle, it means

¹² Roseman G. On Knowledge (*zhi*): Discourse Guide to Action in the «Analects» of Confucius // Comparative Philosophy: Knowledge and Belief in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures / Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. M.: Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2008. P. 20-28.

¹³ Kobzev A.I. Knowledge / Intellect and Belief / Loyalty in Chinese Philosophy // Comparative Philosophy: Knowledge and Belief in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures / Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. M.: Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2008. P. 29-37.

¹⁴ See more: Omelchuk R.K. Etymological Analysis of the Concept of Belief. Ontological Approach // Philosophic Sciences. M.: Publishing house Humanitarian, 2010. № 9. P. 72-86.

¹⁵ Chuang Tzu. Mystic, Moralism, and Social Reformer // Trans. Herbert A. Giles. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1889. P. 13.

¹⁶ Legge J. The life and works of Mencius. London: Trübner, 1875. P. 166.

¹⁷ Titarenko M.L. Ancient Chinese Philosopher Mo Di, His School and Teaching. M.: Nauka Publishing Co., 1985. P. 179.

¹⁸ Yurkevich A.G. Sin // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia. Vol. 1: Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov. Moscow: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. p. 390-391; Kobzev A.I. Tao // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia. Vol. 1: Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov. Moscow: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. P. 392-393.

¹⁹ Kobzev A.I. Knowledge / Intellect and Belief / Loyalty in Chinese Philosophy // Comparative Philosophy: Knowledge and Belief in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures / Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. M.: Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2008. P. 37.

that *zhi* in Chinese philosophy is largely synonymous with *sin* (belief), which indicates spirituality of the former. The objects of such intellect are Tao, «Heaven» (*tian*) and «The Great Ultimate» (*tai chi*), in the light of which nature, human relationships and human life are spiritualized in general. But these objects do not imply any opposition or separation of the spiritual and the material, of the social and the natural²⁰.

Tao necessarily implies the possibility of its attainment by *zhi*. A.I. Kobzev notes that, on the one hand, whatever particular aspect of the category is taken, eventually a single, undifferentiated Tao is to be attained²¹. On the other hand, he notes that «at the everyday level cognition and implementation of Tao are available even to the stupid and the useless ones, but in its extreme realization, it contains something incognizable and inaccessible even to the «sages»»²². Heaven gives the prospect of personal immortality, which is also quite accessible to *zhi*. Such Heaven is considered to be not an abstraction or an ideal, but as the reality of this world, which is located above the Earth and Man. According to A.I. Kobzev, «at the turn of I and II millennium B.C., with coming of *Zhou* era character *Tian* started to mean a single supreme impersonal divinity which in the role of the supreme world controlling power replaced «supreme divine ancestor» (*shangdi*) of preceding Shang-yin era»²³. The most noteworthy moment is an impersonality of Heaven, which allows to interpret this category both as nature and as a force. «Radical naturalization of Heaven resulted in not only a denial of formerly attributed to it divine and supernatural forces, but also recognition of possibility that a man can attain Heaven and of “subordination of heavenly predestination (*min*) to *zhi*», i.e. of man’s control over nature and his own

destiny»²⁴. As for the category «The Great Limit» it should be noted that although it was used for accentuation on the immensity and incomprehensibility of the origins of the world, its «external» (primary) semantic meaning implies ability of intellect to cognize the ultimate state of being which is indicated by this category.

So, *zhi* is largely consistent with *sin* (belief), because the object of such intellect is completely cognizable, real and at the same time spiritual truth. We emphasize that the Tao, «Heaven» and «The Great Limit» are attainable by spiritualized intellect (*zhi*), but in contrast to the object of cognition of transcending intellect *buddhi*, *zhi* mostly refers to this world.

Ancient Greek *logos* is also interesting. The process of its transformation from the time of Homer until the time of Plotinus can be considered as another article. Since The Antiquity closes times of the ancient world and starts a new era in the history of intellect, the analysis of the essence of *logos* is better to start with an analysis of its object, which is at various stages of development of antique thought had taken different forms: Myth, Cosmos, Idea and One. These categories are worthy of attention, since their essence is the originality of *logos*.

The ancient Greeks considered the myth not to be just a story, but something that is alive, real, independent and capable of telling itself. The myth is nothing else than story of our soul, story of the truth, story of beauty. Myth is not a fairy tale and it’s not a lie, but a personal experiencing of the around world as true being. For example, consideration of the myth in close connection with the living symbol allowed A.F. Losev to define it (myth) as a «really implemented existential completeness of this or that personal destiny», and *name* as a «magic-mythic character»²⁵ or concentrated myth. Every name revealed the ancient Greek one or another aspect of the living world around him, which is personally responded to appeal of particular

²⁰ Omelchuk R.K. *Ontology of Belief*. M.: Russian Politic Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2011. 280 p.

²¹ Kobzev A.I. *Tao // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia*. Vol. 1. Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov. Moscow: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. P. 221.

²² Ibid. P. 222.

²³ Ibid. P. 441.

²⁴ Ibid. P. 442.

²⁵ Losev A.F. *Entity and Name*. St.-Petersburg: Publisher Oleg Abyshko, 2008. P. 111, 112.

person. In our opinion, the most interesting point in the ancient Greek myth is that in center of it a man had already been placed: the gods played a secondary role, complementing and balancing the life of a man in the world. It is also important to note that in the world view of the ancient Hindu, gods such as Zeus, Poseidon, Hades etc., had the status of «demigods» and were named as *suras* («divine persons») in the sense that they faithfully fulfilled the divine will and ideally regulated livelihoods of people. The reality of Zeus, Poseidon, Hades and other gods was undoubtful for the ancient Greeks because of reality of such phenomena as thunder and lightning, storm and surf, pain and death. For Homer «Every god is universal being, which is given in a particular way, i.e. as infinite knowledge, power and life, which is given individually»²⁶.

Such an approach largely characterizes myth from its essential aspect: the myth as a name, the myth as a person. «In respect of this myth *logos* is a method of discrimination, dividing and analysis, which can never be exhaustive as there is always something independent and defying logic dismemberment in the myth. However *logos* still analyzes myth so deeply that may refer to many very important aspects of the myth»²⁷. According to W. Hirsch, *logos* can't comprehend the idea of soul of living creature, as vivid living soul does not fit into the fixed order of ideas, and this makes *logos* to be problematic. *Logos* generates *Sagen* (German word for «tale») as the truth which is available through the revelation. But *logos* can be focused not so much on self-knowledge, but on self-realization. In this case hearing of epos takes a second place, giving way to such cognition, which simultaneously will be revelation of inner truth.

So Socrates maxim «Know thyself» becomes a «motto» of ancient culture in which a microcosm cognizes macrocosm mainly

not through «hearing», as it was in ancient India, but through «speaking». With formation of antique philosophy such a «speaking» assumes speculative character, regulated with traditional demands of society to the individual. It should also be emphasized that for A.A. Potebnya, S.N. Trubeckoy, P.A. Florensky, S.N. Bulgakov, M. Heidegger, A.F. Losev, M.K. Mamardashvili etc. in this aspect *logos* is a representation of the myth as the truth of being.

This trend contributed to that that by and by instead of myth cosmos became the object of cognition. However, as Plato stated in the dialogue «Timaeus», «it [cosmos, universe] has been created in the image of that which is comprehensible by reason and wisdom»²⁸. Such an understanding of the cosmos is different from analogous concepts of the ancient Indian philosophy (Sanskrit. *Brahmand, Jagat, Loka*) in that aspect that the former is understood not only as a finite one, but also a single one. The ancient Indians knew that though universes are countless, none of them is subject to human understanding, and even the «secondary» creator of the Universe, Brahma, can't quite grasp it. «At the end of «Timaeus» (92c), which was devoted to the theory of world creation, Plato wrote enthusiastically: «Having received a mortal and immortal beings and got filled with them, our cosmos became visible living being, encompassing everything visible. It became sensible god, the image of god of everything intelligible, the greatest and the best, the most beautiful and the most perfect, single and homogeneous heaven». For Plato this heaven that is always rotating in itself with strict accuracy of its movements, at the same time is sensually perceived cosmos, i.e. the universal body which is perfectly organized, and universal living being and visible god»²⁹. Thus, the ancient Greeks looked on Cosmos in a different way than the ancient Indians did, but this way was still not the way a modern man looks on Cosmos now.

²⁶ Losev A.F. History of Ancient Aesthetics: Early Classic. M.: AST Publishing Co.; Kharkov: Folio Publishing Co., 2000. P. 246-247.

²⁷ Losev A.F. Ancient Philosophy of History. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. P. 165.

²⁸ Plato. Timaeus / Plato; transl. by R.D. Archer-Hind. London: Macmillan, 1888. P. 89.

²⁹ Losev A.F. Ancient Philosophy of History. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. P. 18.

A modern man can't conceive the world as finite. Such a world view is the result of abstract thinking, which basic category is infinity. However, sensuously perceptible world can't be infinite, and that fact to some extent indicates theoretical character of worldview of a modern man. In Homer, however, Cosmos is finite in space and has a particular shape, but that does not mean that outside the space it is emptiness. It should be noted that Homer's Cosmos is living and intelligent, but it doesn't signify the consciousness of the individual as compared with the Tao and Brahman. Taking into consideration that it was Pythagoras who for the first time used the concept of Cosmos in theoretical sense, let's note that for Pythagoreans Cosmos is an animate, single, and made up of opposites of limited and unlimited. Cosmos in understanding of Anaxagoras is quite material and corporeal³⁰.

«Antes, para el hombre griego, para lo que luego se va a llamar el pagano, realidad significaba el conjunto de las cosas psico-corporales o cosmos: la piedra, la planta, el animal, el hombre, el astro; es decir, lo que se ve y se toca más lo que se presume como ingrediente invisible e intangible de lo que se ve y se toca. Cuando el griego meditaba sobre esa realidad e intentaba descubrir su estructura esencial, llegaba a conceptos como substancia, causa, cualidad, movimiento, etc.; en suma, a las categorías del ser cósmico»³¹. [In the period of Antiquity for Greek, who later would be named a pagan, the reality meant the set of psychophysical elements or *cosmos*: stone, plant, animal, human being, heavenly body etc. — set of everything that can be seen and touched as opposed to invisible and intangible component of the visible and tangible. When Greek thought about this reality and tried to reveal its essential structure, he used such concepts as «substance», «cause», «quality», «movement» etc. In short, he used the categories of cosmic being].

³⁰ Losev A.F. History of Ancient Aesthetics: Early Classic. M.: AST Publishing Co.; Kharkov: Folio Publishing Co., 2000. P. 188, 293, 348.

³¹ Ortega y Gasset J. En Torno a Galileo (esquema de las crisis). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1984. P. 64. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.4shared.com/office/3wYn-CQz/1933_En_torno_a_Galileo_Jos_Or.html (2 September 2013).

So, at first a man shifted his focus from a living myth to bodily Cosmos, and then his attention was entirely drawn to functional characteristics of the latter. A.F. Losev noted that the use of concept of «god» by Aristotle bears purely functional character: its function is to characterize the perfect structure of Cosmos. Aristotle (Met., XII 7, 1072 b 22-30): «For intellect has the ability to take an object of its thought and essence, and having it, he acts so, that everything which seems in it to be of divine nature is rather having than just an ability to have and speculation is the most enjoyable and best of all. If, therefore, we feel good — sometimes, God — always, then it is amazing; if it feels even better, then it is still more amazing. And that is exactly what happens to intellect. And without doubt living is inherent in it, because the activity of intellect is life, and it is nothing else than activity. Its activity, as it is, is the best and eternal life. We argue, therefore, that God is a living being, which is eternal and best. Life and continuous, eternal existence is his property, because that is what God is»³².

Analyzing the nature of the Greek *techne*, A.F. Losev, spotted with a surprise that «even the most abstract sciences Greek looked on not as an abstract objectivity of pure thought, but as a more or less intense, live, and in a sense, physical search and creativity, as a kind of technical skill and craft»³³. Utilitarian perfection of art, craft, science, life, nature, making them in the mind of the Greek to be equal, is aimed at confirmation of a man as the most individual in Cosmos (which is the most general). The intellect in the context of ancient Greek philosophy is live in the sense that it manages to combine perfectly the integrity and individuality.

In general, *logos* in the understanding of the ancient Greeks is the prime cause, first principle, that brings to the fore the fact of the beginning of life. This understanding of *logos* became the foundation for the biblical

³² Losev A.F. Ancient Philosophy of History. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. P. 186-187.

³³ Losev A.F. History of Ancient Aesthetics: Early Classic. M.: AST Publishing Co.; Kharkov: Folio Publishing Co., 2000. P. 244.

religious understanding: «In the beginning was the *Logos*, and the *Logos* was with God, and the *Logos* was God». Thus, the ancient antique principle, consisting in the fact that «thinking is a conversation of the soul with itself of past encounters with God»³⁴ has been adopted by Christian thinkers for justification of their belief by means of intellect.

It is widely known that in medieval Christian philosophy intellect was inevitably considered in connection with belief, since, as you know, philosophy served as the handmaid to theology. However, the fundamental difference of religious belief in its modern sense from belief in the understanding of ancient people requires further clarification. God becomes the object of cognition. This object is incomprehensible to intellect and attainable only by means of belief. Lack of belief is compensated by *reason*, which has an ability to search and find the cause of everything in God. Intellect, as it is, belongs to God, and therefore human intellect without God is weak and does not responsible for his own words³⁵. According to Tertullian, «the Word [of God] became a flesh, so he as the source of life should be found and devoured with hearing, chewed with intellect and digested with beliefs»³⁶. In fact, from these words it can already be understood orientation and specialization of the medieval intellect, as well as its strength and autonomy.

It should be noted that the concept of God in the Middle Ages is largely abstracted, that significantly affected the value attitudes requiring reasons, justifications and excuses. Thomas Aquinas answered the question whether the name «God» refers to the nature of [God] as follows: «Because therefore God is not known to us in His na-

ture, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we can name Him from these... For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all... But taken from this operation, this name «God» is imposed to signify the divine nature»³⁷. Various names (Jehovah, Savior, Trinity, Almighty, etc.), which God were called in the Middle Ages, were perceived as arguments for proving His existence, His hypostasis, His nature or His qualitative superiority over the gods of other religions³⁸. However, being the most frequently used name «God» (*Theos*) was being «dissolved», pointing at His absolute superiority over man.

F. Nietzsche characterized «unnatural» and «perverse» concept of God used by «agitating priests» as a means of manipulating the consciousness of believers as «Nominal God». German thinker positively assessed that unity with Israel by means of which Jehovah as a caring, advising and darling God expressed the people's consciousness of the ancient Hebrews, but he was critical of the abstraction of God as a concept that is unattainable for rational understanding. The reality of God in The Medieval Europe was opposed to the reality, which any reasonable person belonged to. It should be noted here that from the position of philosophy the presence of conscience which religious man has, also proves division of his «I»: «For committing certain acts which emanates from our «I», we know about them, probably, already in another system, actualizing some other structures, and then relate, associate with something that is external, extra-personal, exposing ourselves to the court, which works in us, as if it were someone else»³⁹. Thereby «Die Moral, nicht mehr der Ausdruck der Lebens- und Wachstums-Bedingungen eines Volk <s>, nicht mehr sein unterster Ins-

³⁴ Mamardashvili M.K. Cartesian Meditations. M.: Progress Publishing Co., 2001. P. 187.

³⁵ Tertullian. Against Hermogenes // Ante-Nicene Christian library: translation of the writings of the fathers down to a.d. 325 / Edit. A. Roberts, J. Donaldson. Volum 1. Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1869. P. 498; Tertullian. On repentance // Ante-Nicene Christian library: translation of the writings of the fathers down to a.d. 325 / Edit. A. Roberts, J. Donaldson. Volum 1. Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1869. P. 657.

³⁶ Tertullian. Concerning the resurrection of the flesh // Translation of Christian literature. Series II Latin texts / A. Souter, D.Litt. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. P. 90.

³⁷ Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica. Part I. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920. P. 168.

³⁸ Talmont-Kaminski K. Religion as magical ideology: how the supernatural reflects rationality. Bristol; Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd, 2013. 160 p.

³⁹ Sergeantov V.F. Man, his nature and the meaning of life. Leningrad: Publishing house of Leningrad State University, 1990. P. 204.

tinkt des Lebens, sondern abstrakt geworden, Gegensatz zum Leben geworden»⁴⁰. [Morality is no longer a reflection of the conditions which make for the sound life and development of the people; it is no longer the primary life-instinct; instead it has

become abstract and in opposition to life]. On the one hand, even choosing ascetic life of a monk, whose life seemed to be entirely in an atmosphere of pious religiosity, didn't guarantee that a man was saved and could attain God⁴¹. On the other hand, a monk, a priest became the only reality, assuring the believer that God is real. In general, the crisis of medieval rationality clearly expressed in the inability of scholastic logic to explain how from individual and particular experience could be derived universal and absolutely necessary truths⁴².

Although the Renaissance is a transitional period it plays an important role in value transformation of intellect. It's widely known, that humanization significantly affected the way of human thinking, making for his research orientation and creativity. In the Middle Ages man called God the Creator whose creation he (a man) himself was, but now people tried to prove their right to be independent from God by means of creativity. Value feature of such creativity can be regarded not an ancient revelation of truth as natural beauty and harmony, but the aspiration to discover the truth and proclaim it as pertaining to a man.

Anthropocentrism of the Renaissance was the basis for further value transformation of intellect and concentration of research interest not only on the autonomy and subjectivity of thinking, but also on its speculative capacity. For more than a thousand years thinking was limited to the dogmas of the Church, so the trend towards the emancipation of intellect and its getting rid of strictly theistic focus largely contributed to the rationalization and clearly separation of God and

a man. P.K. Grechko in his course of philosophy marks the most important characteristics of thinking in the Renaissance:

«Mind (the basic concept in the logic of Nicholas of Cusa) is particularly historic, special definition of universal intellect. The word «mind» (*mens*) Nicholas of Cusa derives of *mensurare* which means «to determine» and that is very important for understanding his research method. The mind is a measurer, or determinant of things. Such a definition of measure and inner boundary of object should be understood not in terms of quantification, but in terms of fixing the value of things or processes that already have the measure of the infinite. It is ruler's and divider's turn when the mind has identified measure of things, that is to say, when it (mind) turned an infinite into finite and thus made the infinite to be cognizable, and made the finite to be an image of the eternity as space of endless linear consecution»⁴³. *Mens* conditions that that has never been conditioned and therefore has not been looked on as conditioned; *mens* limits that that has never been limited, and therefore has not been considered to be limited; *mens* measures that that has never been measured, and therefore has not been looked on as measured. So the truth as an object of cognition transformed into an adapted «finite» infinity which today anyone without hesitation can imagine in the form of number eight lying on its side.

Modern European philosophy implies significant shift in the understanding of intellect. Galileo Galilei was the first who proposed the formal method of thinking which in practice implied description of law as formula with variables and constants. Rene Descartes characterized intellect as *ratio*. Rationality of *ratio* primarily reveals itself in its mathematical accuracy and hierarchy. In XX century, M. Heidegger in his lectures on Parmenides⁴⁴ consistently characterized intellect as *ratio*,

⁴⁰ Nietzsche F. Der Antichrist. Erstausgabe, 1895. P. 26.

⁴¹ McGrath A.E. The passionate intellect: Christian faith and the discipleship of the mind. Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2010. 210 p.

⁴² Avtonomova N.S. Reason. Intellect. Rationality. Moscow: Nauka Publishing Co., 1988. P. 15.

⁴³ Grechko P.K. Philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance // Philosophy [electronic resource]. Mode of access: <http://web-local.rudn.ru/web-local/uem/ido/11/ph6.html> (2 September 2013).

⁴⁴ Heidegger M. Parmenides / M. Heidegger; trans. by A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. 170 p.

emphasizing its «roman» commitment to calculation and utility unlike «antique» commitment to meaning and values.

Distinguishing in Martin Heidegger's «Detachment» (1959) two types of thinking (one, aspired to calculation and another aspired to reflection) and their analysis form the basis of his theory of social phenomenon cognizing. «Wir rechnen im voraus auf bestimmte Erfolge. Dieses Rechnen kennzeichnet alles planende und forschende Denken. Solches Denken bleibt auch dann ein Rechnen, wenn es nicht mit Zahlen operiert und nicht die Zählmaschine und keine Großrechenanlage in Gang setzt. Das rechnende Denken kalkuliert. Es kalkuliert mit fortgesetzt neuen, mit immer aussichtsreicheren und zugleich billigeren Möglichkeiten. Das rechnende Denken hetzt von einer Chance zur nächsten. Das rechnende Denken hält nie still, kommt nicht zur Besinnung. Das rechnende Denken ist kein besinnliches Denken, kein Denken, das dem Sinn nachdenkt, der in allem waltet, was ist»⁴⁵ [This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is].

Truth as a philosophical concept in the New times was transformed into a purely epistemological phenomenon: process of cognizing of the truth became more important and meaningful than the truth itself. A man started to understand the truth not only as something impersonal, but also as an abstract aim that could never be reached regardless of how much effort had been made. Naturally, this approach, intensified with rationalist and consumer spirits led to the loss of interest to the truth. The truth became a matter of few theo-

rists, who often were quite distant from real life, and stopped to be real aim which personifies a true being, which could be achieved by every person in his own life. «The concept of truth in its «Russian understanding» is a «remaineth existence». It is «living», «breathing creature», i.e. it has the essential condition of life and existence. The truth, as a living creature par excellence, is the notion of it which the Russian have»⁴⁶ — P.A. Florensky wrote in his book «The Pillar and Ground of the Truth» (1914). It is no wonder that truth for such a «calculating» intellect of «rapacious epistemological subject»⁴⁷ and corresponding to it type of thinking took the form of objective laws of nature. This type of rationality is characterized today as a classic.

Ratio is characterized with taking one or another extreme position: dividing something into parts, it immediately opposes one part to another, ignoring just broken unity. Consideration of practice as a criterion of truth can also be looked on as devaluation. Spiritual practice and body control practice, integrated in ancient Indian yoga, in ancient Chinese ceremony, in ancient Greek sport, in medieval asceticism, got radically different solutions in the New times. In this context, let's pay attention to symbolism of «newness» referred to these times: time, allotted for body, was not just brought to the fore, but it completely obscured the problem of existence of eternal soul in the temporal body as *ratio*, plunging into something that attracts its attention, tends to forget about everything else. In our opinion, that is the moment from which trend to «specialization» of knowledge begins, when time and life are spent on development of something particular, relative, which takes the value only in relation to the unitary system of sciences. Meaning and value, taken in its pure form, are set aside and got forgotten and a man is looking for new meaning and value in the depth of their opposites. On the one hand, the soul in the human body can devote all its time to abstract thinking, forgetting that it is the body which time is limited, allows to attain the absolute truth, and not just a special meaning. On

⁴⁵ Heidegger Martin. Gelassenheit. Gunther Neske. Pfullingen, 1959. P. 14-15.

⁴⁶ Florensky P.A. The Pillar and Ground of the Truth. Volume 1. M.: Pravda Publishing Co., 1990. P. 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid. P. 74.

the other hand, the soul in the human body may devote all its time to such activities, the meaning of which is limited to the needs of the body, forgetting that attainment of absolute truth is the condition of meeting the needs of the soul. The first leads to so-called «new knowledge», or to birth of the «new truths», the second leads to usual «meaninglessness» of everyday life, which everyone can experience by doing his day-to-day «work», the results of which are summarized in the cost of labor and time spent on its doing. For example, I.A. Gobozov writes: «People work together, plan to get something universally significant, and in the end it turns out that they get something that no one wanted, and no one expected»⁴⁸. However, time spent on «meaninglessness» can't be compensated, and because of it truth has to be always invented and dreamed up as an excuse for made efforts. G.W.F. Hegel wrote that «In dieser Überzeugung steht jedes unbefangene Bewußtsein wie die Philosophie, und hiervon geht diese ebenso in Betrachtung des geistigen Universums aus als des natürlichen. Wenn die Reflexion, das Gefühl oder welche Gestalt das subjektive Bewußtsein habe, die Gegenwart für ein Eitles ansieht, über sie hinaus ist und es besser weiß, so befindet es sich im Eitlen, und weil es Wirklichkeit nur in der Gegenwart hat, ist es so selbst nur Eitelkeit»⁴⁹ [The ingenuous mind adheres with simple conviction to the truth which is publicly acknowledged. On this foundation it builds its conduct and way of life]. This is paradox of classical rationality: *ratio*, trying to gain more and more, loses itself. «Absolutely rational society is no less dangerous than the irrational one»⁵⁰.

F. Nietzsche, who called himself «immoralist» with regard to moral, contributing to personal degradation, believed that «Der Begriff «Gott» erfunden als Gegensatz-Begriff zum Lebenthe»⁵¹ [The concept «God» was invented as the opposed of the concept

life], and «Was ein Theologe als wahr empfindet, das muss falsch sein: man hat daran beinahe ein Kriterium der Wahrheit»⁵² [Whatever a theologian regards as true must be false: there you have almost a criterion of truth]. This position reflects extreme, but at the same time distinct value aspect. Why did the German philosopher focus on the fact that «true» world was invented to depreciate the earthly world, soul was invented to depreciate a healthy body, kindness was invented to depreciate the strong, dignified, and confident in the future man? In our opinion, being a brilliant thinker, who anticipated the evolution of mankind, F. Nietzsche understood that depreciating rationality penetrated the very essence of the irrational («[Gott] ward «Ideal», ward «reiner Geist», ward «absolutum», ward «Ding an sich»⁵³ [[God] became the «ideal», became «pure spirit», became «absolute», became «the thing-in-itself»]). He foresaw total destructiveness of such a trend at the socio-cultural level of reality («Der Europäer von Heute bleibt, in seinem Werthe tief unter dem Europäer der Renaissance»⁵⁴ [The European of today, in his essential worth, falls far below the European of the Renaissance]).

As an illustrative example, let's note that the philosophy of socialism, in practice relying on so-called «social power» of crowd, largely contributed to the conditioning of *ratio*. N.S. Avtonomova, associating *ratio* with the production of goods, calls it a «truncated rationality» or «distorted intelligence»: «A man is only partially engaged in the production of a commodity: partially, because he spends on it only a small piece of his strengths and capabilities, and because he owns, controls only a small part of this work — its beginning and end, the original purpose of work and its completion aren't his anymore. The more loose connection between a man and what he produces the more poor his needs, emotions, and susceptibility to the environment are»⁵⁵. As a result of dis-

⁴⁸ Gobozov I.A. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. M.: TEIS Publishing Co., 1999. P. 310.

⁴⁹ Hegel G.W.F. Grundlinien der philosophie des rechts. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970. P. 25.

⁵⁰ Gobozov I.A. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. M.: TEIS Publishing Co., 1999. P. 312.

⁵¹ Nietzsche F. Ecce homo. Der Wille zur Macht. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1922. P. 126.

⁵² Nietzsche F. Der Antichrist. Erstaussgabe, 1895. P. 11.

⁵³ Ibid. P. 19.

⁵⁴ Ibid. P. 6.

⁵⁵ Avtonomova N.S. Reason. Intellect. Rationality. M.: Nauka Publishing Co., 1988. P. 123.

tortion of *ratio* there are such phenomena as fetishism (hypostatization of ideas as separate entities), phenomenism (representation of phenomenon as the essence), fragmentation (absolutisation of particular one as general one), unhistoricity (absolutisation of some historical period or social order at the expense of the past or future), etc. that can get a wide spread across the society.

As the Renaissance contributed to a clear distinction between God and man, the New time turned out to be an era of «rational» castling of God and man, when *ratio* without any obvious losses swapped them⁵⁶. As in the New time the object of abstract, theoretical, rational thinking (*ratio*) were objective laws of nature, in XX century the object of specialized thinking as qualification of having information (*intellect*) is relative laws of artificially created systems. Without any doubt,

value transformation of intellect (*buddhi, zhi, logos, reason, mens, ratio, intellect*) is the basis of formation of modern scientific and technological civilization with its prudent-consumer attitude towards nature, society and a human. In order to objectively assess the trend of these changes, history needs a criterion, which can be found in value attitude of rational man to the truth which is available to his intellect. As V.A. Kutyrev noted, «active displacement of [spirited] intellect [such as *buddhi, zhi, logos* — R.K. Omelchuk] by *intellect* is accompanied with displacement of spirit by mentality as well as displacement of intelligence by intellectualism»⁵⁷. The final point of this kind of research for modern intelligent person can be the answer to the question who (or what?) he himself is in that artificially created world: the creator or a creature, God or a slave?

References:

1. Avtonomova, N.S. Reason. Nous. Rationality. M.: Nauka Publishing Co., 1988. 278 p.
2. Chuang Tzu. Mystic, Moralism, and Social Reformer // Trans. Herbert A. Giles. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1889. 468 p.
3. D'Avray, D.L. Rationalities in history: a Weberian essay in comparison. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 214 p.
4. Florensky, P.A. The Pillar and Ground of the Truth. M.: Pravda Publishing Co., 1990. 490 p.
5. Gobozov, I.A. Introduction to the Philosophy of History. M.: TEIS Publishing Co., 1999. 363 p.
6. Grechko, P.K. Philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance // Philosophy [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: <http://web-local.rudn.ru/web-local/uem/ido/11/ph6.html> (2 September 2013).
7. Heidegger, M. Parmenides / M. Heidegger; trans. by A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. 170 p.
8. Heidegger, Martin. Gelassenheit. Gunther Neske. Pfullingen, 1959. 74 p.
9. Kobzev, A.I. Knowledge/Nous and Belief/Loyalty in Chinese Philosophy // Comparative Philosophy: Knowledge and Belief in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures / Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences. M.: Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2008. P. 29-37.
10. Kobzev, A.I. Tao // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia. Vol. 1: Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov. M.: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. P. 392-393.
11. Kutyrev, V.A. Being or Nothingness. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2010. 496 p.
12. Legge, J. The life and works of Mencius. London: Trübner, 1875. 402 p.

⁵⁶ D'Avray D.L. Rationalities in history: a Weberian essay in comparison. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 214 p.

⁵⁷ Kutyrev V.A. Being or Nothingness. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2010. P. 95.

13. Losev, A.F. *Ancient Philosophy of History*. St.-Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. 263 p.
14. Losev, A.F. *Entity and Name*. St.-Petersburg: Publisher Oleg Abyshko, 2008. 576 p.
15. Losev, A.F. *History of Ancient Aesthetics: Early Classic*. Moscow: AST Publishing Co.; Kharkov: Folio, 2000. 621 p.
16. Mamardashvili, M.K. *Cartesian Meditations*. M.: Progress Publishing Co., 2001. 352 p.
17. McGrath, A.E. *The passionate intellect: Christian faith and the discipleship of the mind*. Downers Grove: IVP Books, 2010. 210 p.
18. Nietzsche, F. *Der Antichrist*. Erstaussgabe, 1895. 70 p.
19. Nietzsche, F. *Ecce homo. Der Wille zur Macht*. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1922. 559 p.
20. Omelchuk, R.K. *Etymological Analysis of the Concept of Belief. Ontological Approach // Philosophic Sciences*. M.: Publishing house Humanitarian, 2010. № 9. P. 72-86.
21. Omelchuk, R.K. *Ontology of Belief*. M.: Russian Politic Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2011. 280 p.
22. Ortega y Gasset, J. *En Torno a Galileo (esquema de las crisis)*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1984. 95 p. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.4shared.com/office/3wYn-CQz/1933_En_torno_a_Galileo_Jos_Or.html (2 September 2013).
23. Plato. *Timaeus / Plato*; transl. by R.D. Archer-Hind. London: Macmillan, 1888. 358 p.
24. Prabhupada, A.C. *Bhaktivedanta Swami. Bhagavad-Gita as It is*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972. 1046 p.
25. Prabhupada, A.C. *Bhaktivedanta Swami. Sri Isopanisad*. Los Angeles: ISKCON books, 1969. 129 p.
26. Prabhupada, A.C. *Bhaktivedanta Swami. Srimad-Bhagavatam. Canto 1: Creation (chapters 1-9)*. New York: Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1972. 374 p.
27. Prabhupada, A.C. *Bhaktivedanta Swami. Srimad-Bhagavatam. Canto 5: The Creative Impetus (chapters 1-13)*. New York: Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, 1975. 545 p.
28. Rodzinskiy, D.L. *Nonexistence and Existence of Consciousness in the Early Forms of Indian, Chinese and Greek Philosophy*. M.: Publishing house of Moscow Psychological and Social Institute, 2006. 280 p.
29. Roseman, G. *On Knowledge (zhi): Discourse Guide to Action in the «Analects» of Confucius // Comparative Philosophy: Knowledge and Belief in the Context of the Dialogue of Cultures / Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences*. M.: Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2008. P. 20-28.
30. Rowlands, M. *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 249 p.
31. Sergeantov, V.F. *Man, his nature and the meaning of life*. Leningrad: Publishing house of Leningrad State University, 1990. 360 p.
32. Talmont-Kaminski, K. *Religion as magical ideology: how the supernatural reflects rationality*. Bristol; Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd, 2013. 160 p.
33. Tertullian. *Concerning the resurrection of the flesh / A. Souter, D.Litt*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. 205 p.
34. Tertullian. *On repentance // Ante-Nicene Christian library: translation of the writings of the fathers down to a.d. 325 / Edit. A. Roberts, J. Donaldson. Volume 1*. Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1869. 506 p.
35. Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologica. Part I*. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920. 419 p.
36. Titarenko, M.L. *Ancient Chinese Philosopher Mo Di, His School and Teaching*. M.: Nauka Publishing Co., 1985. 245 p.
37. Yurkevich, A.G. *Sin // Spiritual Culture of China: five-volume encyclopedia. Vol. 1: Philosophy / ed. M.L. Titarenko, A.I. Kobzev, A.E. Lukyanov*. M.: Institute of the Far East; Oriental Literature Publishing Co., 2006. P. 390-391.